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Negotiability in Consumer Sales:
The Need for Further Study
I. INTRODUCTION
Because few people can afford to pay cash for consumer goods
and services, and because most dealers in such goods and services
are not in the business of lending money, the typical consumer-
dealer transaction involves a third-party financer.1 The most com-
mon method of financing the purchase of goods and services is
the three-party installment credit sale. Under this arrangement,
when the consumer purchases goods from the dealer, he obligates
himself to pay the dealer in a series of monthly installments by
signing an installment sales contract. Pursuant to a clause in the
contract, the dealer may assign to a financer the right to receive
the monthly payments. In substance, what this amounts to is an
indirect loan from the financer to the consumer. In contrast to
the indirect loan transaction, the consumer may borrow money di-
rectly from the financer; the consumer can then pay cash for his
goods and services. A third type of financing is available through
the use of a lender credit card.2 The cardholder may use the card
* B.A., 1971, and J.D., 1973, University of Nebraska. Member of the
Nebraska State Bar Association.
1. Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in
the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. RBv. 272, 274 (1969). B. CLARx & J.
FONSECA, HADLmN Coxsumva CREnrr CASES § 1 at 1 (1972), notes:
"The day of the cash-and-carry transaction is gone. Buying now and
paying later has become a way of life for all Americans except for
the very rich."
2. For discussions of the emergence of the lender credit card in con-
sumer transactions and the legal issues which it presents, see Brandel
& Leonard, Bank Credit Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69 MIcE.
L. REv. 1033 (1971); Davenport, -Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform,
Commercial Code, 85 BANIG L.J. 941 (1968); Comment, Waiver
of Defense Clauses in Three Party Consumer Credit Transactions, 11
B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 90 (1969); Comment, The Tripartite Credit
Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALi. L. REv. 459 (1960); Com-
ment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to Modern
Bank Card-Systems, 18 KAN. L. Rnv. 871 (1970); Comment, Commer-
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just like cash to purchase goods and services from participating
dealers.3 Participating dealers have an agreement with the issuer
of the card, the lender, whereby the issuer has agreed to pay the
dealer for goods sold to cardholders. The issuer is then responsible
for collection from the cardholder.4
Traditionally, financers, in each of the three transactions de-
scribed above, have insulated themselves from consumer defenses
against the dealer. That is, the consumer's obligation to satisfy
the financer is independent of the dealer's obligation to satisfy the
consumer; the financer may proceed against the consumer despite
any defenses the consumer may have against the dealer, such as
failure of consideration or breach of warranty. In the three-party
installment sale transactions, financers have typically used either
the promissory note or the contractual waiver of defense clause,
or both to facilitate cutting off the buyer's defenses against the
financer. The same result is achieved in credit card financing by
inserting a waiver clause in the agreement between cardholder and
issuer, whereby the cardholder agrees that he will not assert
against the issuer any defenses which arise out of any sales trans-
actions with a dealer.5
Preservation of consumer defenses has been and continues to
be one of the most hotly debated issues in the consumer credit
industry. Consumer advocates argue that the only real protection
a consumer has against dealer misconduct is the power to withhold
payment. Furthermore, if the consumer may withhold payment,
he has the procedural advantage of placing the burden of initiating
litigation on the dealer or financer.6 On the other hand, many
banking and financial institutions argue that if they were subject
cial Transactions: Section 9-206 and its Applicability to the Tripartite
Credit Card, 21 OKLA. L. REv. 59 (1968).
3. The lender charges the dealer a percentage of the sales price. The
discount ranges from 2 to 7%.
4. The cardholder normally receives a monthly statement from the
lender. He then has the option of paying the entire bill or paying
a certain minimum percentage of the total. If the cardholder pays
the entire bill, there is no interest charge. If the card is used in
this manner, it may be a convenient way to consolidate many
monthly expenses into one check payment at no cost. On the other
hand, if the cardholder pays the bill in installments, he pays interest
on the unpaid balance.
5. A typical clause in the agreement provides:
Issuer has no responsibility for merchandise or services pur-
chased by Customer with Credit Card and Customer agrees
to pay issuer for all credit purchases even though a dispute
may exist.
6. Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit
Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 535, 550 (1967).
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to consumer defenses, consumer credit might vanish or become so
expensive as to be prohibitive.7 The debate has prompted judicial
and legislative response. The primary thrust of this response has
been directed against the use of promissory notes and waiver of
defense clauses in installment sales transactions. To a lesser ex-
tent, there have been some legislative measures preserving defenses
in the direct loan and the lender credit card transaction.8
At present, the impact of preserving consumer defenses on the
consumer credit industry is an unknown quantity. Statistical data
on the subject is virtually non-existent. Much of the debate over
the extent if any, to which financers should be subject to consumer
defenses, would seem to turn on the determination of factual is-
sues. Is protection for the consumer, in the form of allowing him
to assert his defenses against the financer, needed in all segments
of the consumer sales industry or just certain ones such as home
solicitation sales or sales of motor vehicles? Has there been a gen-
eral shift from the indirect loan transaction to direct loans so as
to necessitate preservation of defenses in the latter transaction as
well as the former? Will the cost of credit increase if defenses
are preserved? Will preservation of defenses force some dealers
out of business? Despite the lack of empirical evidence to answer
these questions, many legislatures have enacted statutes which
preserve consumer defenses in a variety of transactions. The legis-
lation has been justified largely on the basis of its "theorized" im-
pact, and not by any factual data.
Two consumer credit bills were introduced in the first session
of the 1974 Nebraska Legislature. The original draft of L.B. 3259
was concerned with the problem of preserving consumer defenses.
Provisions in L.B. 325 which eliminated negotiability of all "con-
sumer credit sales" and "consumer leases" were deleted from the
bill by the standing committee amendments.10 A later part of this
article will discuss these original provisions of the bill.1 The other
bill, L.B. 327,12 enacted by the Legislature with an emergency
7. Cohen, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code-A Design for Disaster,
23 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 10, 11 (1968).
8. Littlefield, Preservation of Consumer Defenses in Interlocking Loans
and Credit Card Transactions-Recent Statutes, Policies, and a Propo-
sal, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 471; Littlefield, supra note 1.
9. L.B. 325, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1974).
10. 1974 NEB. LEG. JRm.. 771 (Feb. 25, 1974). L.B. 325's original language
was struck and replaced with the provisions of Senator Waldron's
original L.B. 327, which earlier had been amended by Senator Mur-
phy. See note 14 infra.
11. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text infra.
12. L.B. 327, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1974).
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clause on March 21, 1974,' s was only indirectly related to the preser-
vation of consumer defenses.14 Although the original draft of L.B.
325 never reached the floor of the Legislature, and L.B. 327, even in
its original form, only indirectly touched the problem, debate over
preservation of consumer defenses is likely to be a recurring one in
the Nebraska Legislature as the interest in consumer legislation
increases. This article will survey the variety of legislation that has
developed in other states and it will suggest how empirical study in
certain areas might shape future legislation.
II. LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
Much has been written about the problem of preservation of
consumer defenses.15 There is no need to duplicate extensive
13. 1974 NEB. LEG. JRNL. 1239 (March 21, 1974).
14. As introduced by Senator 'Waldron, LB. 327 would have provided
consumers with a cause of action against "suppliers" who commit de-
ceptive and unconscionable sales practices, in connection with con-
sumer transactions. A "supplier" was to be defined as a "seller, les-
sor, assignor, or other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or
enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly with
the consumer." Under Waldron's form of the bill, a financer was
certainly one who "enforces consumer transactions" and if the con-
sumer could have established that the financer had engaged in a de-
ceptive or unconscionable practice, he could have pursued an action
directly against the financer.
After reaching the floor of the Unicameral, LB. 327 was substan-
tially amended upon motion of Senator Murphy, 1974 NEB. LEG. Jinm.
649 (Feb. 14, 1974), to delete the provisions described in the preced-
ing paragraph. In its amended form, L.B. 327 contained some addi-
tions to the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ns. REv. STAT.
§§ 87-301 to -306 (Reissue 1971). During debate of L.B. 327 on the
floor of the Legislature, Senator Murphy said he thought
[r] equiring that a consumer sign a contract waiver and all
this defense ... come under the definition of unconscionable.
I'll grant you unconscionable is not a clearly defined word.
The courts are left with the interpretation of it which the
courts are left with the interpretation of anyhow.
Record of floor debate on L.B. 327 at 5606 (Feb. 25, 1974). This com-
ment would suggest that Senator Murphy felt his bill did not need
to consider the waiver of defense problem because Nebraska courts
might find such clauses unconscionable. See note 27 and accompany-
ing text infra.
15. Some of the leading articles are: Felsenfeld, supra note 6, at 549-
53; Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and the UCC-Limitations on Credi-
tors' Agreements and Practices, 33 LAw & CoNTFEV". PROB. 686 (1968);
Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUm.
L. REV. 387, 433-38 (1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation:-A
Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 445, 469-73 (1968);
Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 59 YALE L. REv. 1209, 1214-15 (1950); Littlefield,
supra note 1; Littlefield, supra note 8; Murphy, Another "Assault
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works on the plight of the consumer and the analysis of the alter-
native proposals to remedy the problem. However, a survey of
the problem and a summary of the judicial and legislative re-
sponses to it will serve as a framework for further discussion.
A. Judicial Response
If the consumer signs a promissory note, and the dealer then
negotiates the note to a financer, the financer becomes a holder
in due course if he took the note for value, in good faith and with-
out notice of any defenses to it.16 A holder in due course takes
the instrument free from any "personal" defenses of any party
to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt.17  What
Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and
Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 667
(1968); Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 CoLum. L. REv.
375 (1971); Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
Upon the Market for Consumer Installment Credit, 33 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 752, 761-63 (1968); Comment, Consumer Defenses and Fi-
nancers as Holders in Due Course, 4 CONN. L. REv. 83 (1971).
16. UNinoFm Com~mmcAI CODE § 3-302(1) (1962 Official Text) [herein-
after cited as UCC] provides:
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instru-
ment
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dis-
honored or of any defense against or claim to it
on the part of any person.
17. UCC § 3-305 provides for the rights of a holder in due course:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he
takes the instrument free from(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with
whom the holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple
contract; and(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the
transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a
nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to
sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor rea-
sonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its char-
acter or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice
when he takes the instrument.
Defenses referred to in UCC § 3-305(2) are personal defenses; they
are good only against non-holders-in-due course and the original par-
ties to the instrument. Defenses referred to in UCC § 3-305 (2) (a)
to (e) are real defenses; they are good against anyone, even holders-
in-due course. As an example of the distinction between real and
personal defenses as it relates to a consumer credit transaction, con-
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this means to the consumer is that the financer can enforce the
note even though the consumer has a personal defense against the
dealer which would prevent the dealer from enforcing the note
himself. The same result obtains if the consumer procures a direct
loan from a financer, and then purchases consumer goods from
a dealer for cash. The consumer is a party to two separate and
independent transactions-one a purchase from the dealer, and the
other a loan from the financer.
While a majority of jurisdictions still honor the holder in due
course status of the financer, the courts have developed a num-
ber of theories to deny him that privileged treatment.'8 Most of
the theories are dependent upon the consumer establishing a close
relationship between the dealer and the financer; the "close con-
nectedness" doctrine holds that the purchaser of a negotiable in-
strument is not a holder in due course if he is too closely con-
nected to his transferor.19 It has been held that where the financer
and dealer were intimately connected, the financer could not have
taken the note in good faith and without notice of a defense to
it.20 Some other courts have reasoned that to allow the financer
sider two fraud cases. In the first case, the consumer signs a prom-
issory note, but being misled by the misrepresentation of the dealer
and thereby induced to sign, the consumer does not know that he
has signed a note. Misrepresentations as to the character of the in-
strument, fraud in the execution, is a real defense, and under UCC
§ 3-305 (2) (c) would be good against the financer to whom the dealer
negotiated the note. On the other hand, if the dealer makes a mis-
representation as to the quality of an item, fraud in the inducement
to sign the note, the consumer has only a personal defense. Once
the dealer negotiates the note to the financer, the defense is not good
against the financer.
18. For extensive reviews of the judicial development in the holder-in-
due course cases, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-8 at 479-84 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as WroTE & SUMMERS]; Littlefield, supra note 1, at
275-77; Murphy, supra note 15, at 675-78; Comment, supra note 15, at
91-97.
19. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 479, refers to the recent devel-
opment as the "close connectedness" doctrine.
20. The earliest leading case for this proposition was Commercial Credit
Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940). In Childs, the
consumer signed a document which included an installment sales con-
tract, a promissory note, and on the back of the instrument was a
form for the assignment of the note. The forms were supplied to
the dealer by the financer; the note was executed and assigned the
same day. The court stated:
We think appellant was so closely connected with the entire
transaction or with the deal that it can not be heard to say
that it, in good faith, was an innocent purchaser of the instru-
ment for value before maturity. It financed the deal, pre-
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who has close ties with the dealer to claim the holder in due course
status would be unconscionable.21  A close relation between the
dealer and financer has been held sufficient to make the dealer
an agent of the financer.2 2 The dealer's knowledge of defenses
is therefore imputed to the financer. This brief listing of theories
is by no means complete,23 nor are the categories of cases referred
to intended to be precise. Any one case may have based its de-
cision on one or more of the listed theories. The common factor
in the cases, however, is the close relation between the financer
and the dealer. Some authorities have suggested that rather than
try to categorize cases under one theory or another, it is more
important to identify those circumstances in a case which consti-
tute a "close connection." Five factors have been so identified:
(1) Drafting by the lender of forms for the seller.
(2) Approval or establishment or both of the seller's procedures
by the lender (e.g., setting of the interest rate, approval of a refer-
ral sales plan).
(3) An independent check by the lender on the credit of the
debtor.
(4) Heavy reliance by the seller upon the lender (e.g., transfer
by seller of all or a substantial part of his paper to one lender).
pared the instrument, and on the day it was executed took
an assignment of it from the Arkansas Motors, Inc. Even
before it was executed it prepared the written assignment
thereon to itself. Rather than being a purchaser of the in-
strument after its execution it was to all intents and purposes
a party to the agreement and instrument from the beginning.
Id. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262. See Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams,
244 A.2d 494 (D.C. App. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel,
347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964); Norman v. World Wide Distrib-
utors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963); Jaeger & Branch,
Inc. v. Pappas, 20 Utah 2d 100, 433 P.2d 605 (1967).
21. See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
22. See International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172(1965); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d
886 (1968); Milwaukee Acceptance Corp. v. Dore, 43 Wis. 2d 412, 168
N.W.2d 594 (1969).
23. One other theory, the "identity of parties" theory, denies the financer
holder in due course status where he is really the moving party to
the transaction. Even though the financer may not have been present
during the negotiations between the consumer and the dealer, he may
be deemed to be a party to the instrument and to have knowledge
of the consumer claims and defenses. Comment, supra note 15, at
95 cites Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34
Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950), as a clear illustration of the "identity
of parties" theory. Wimr & Sumnvmas, supra note 18, at 480, refers
to a theory that the "oneness" of the parties is tantamount to no
transfer between them.
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(5) Common or connected ownership or management of seller
and lender.24
The holder in due course doctrine still prevails in most jurisdic-
tions; nevertheless, recent case developments, as described above,
have made the financer's preferred status less certain. Consumers,
at least, have decisional authority from which to formulate a close
connectedness case from a variety of transactions. 25
The waiver of defense clause, as the name indicates, is simply
a clause in the contract between the dealer and the consumer
whereby the consumer agrees that if the contract is assigned to
a third party, the consumer shall be precluded from attacking the
contract on the grounds of fraud, mistake or want of considera-
tion.28 The clause, sometimes referred to as an attempt to create
"negotiability by contract," gives to the financer essentially the
same rights as if he were a holder in due course, i.e., the right
to proceed against the consumer, free from the consumer's claims
and defenses against the dealer.
According to the weight of authority, the waiver of defense
clause is valid.2 7 The Uniform Commercial Code specifically au-
thorizes waiver clauses, but the Code provision is expressly made
subject to any other statute or court decision which may restrict
24. WroTE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 481. Other more intangible fact-
ors include how badly the consumer was treated by the dealer and
the nature of the financer's business. WHITE & SUMMEs notes, "In
each of the four recent cases of close connectedness, the defendant
was a consumer who had been 'reamed, steamed and dry cleaned'
by his seller." Id. at 483. The authors further state:
In addition to the egregiousness of the seller's behavior in
these cases, one should note that the plaintiff in each of them
was a finance company; none involved a bank. A court may
be willing to conclude that paper handled by a finance com-
pany is more smelly than that transferred to a bank, and
may be quicker to infer unproven interrelationships between
seller and finance company than between seller and bank.
Id.
25. WE & SummERs, supra note 18, at 484.
26. A typical waiver of defense clause might read as follows: "If seller
should assign the contract in good faith to a third party, the buyer
shall be precluded against such third party from attacking the valid-
ity of the contract on the grounds of fraud, mistake or want of con-
sideration."
27. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YAIE
L.J. 1057, 1096 (1954); Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the
UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 298, 318 (1969). For cases which have en-
forced the waiver of defense clause, see Jones v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 88 Ga. App. 24, 75 S.E.2d 822 (1953); Anglo-California
Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 991 (1922). See comment of
Senator Murphy in note 14 supra indicating that he felt waiver of
defense clauses might be found unconscionable in Nebraska.
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the waiver's effectiveness in the case of a buyer of consumer
goods.28  There have been a few courts which have held the clauses
unenforceable as void attempts to create negotiability outside the
framework of the Uniform Commercial Code.29 In addition to
these public policy theories, some courts have refused to enforce
waivers of the defense of fraud.3 0
There are very few reported cases dealing with the preserva-
tion of consumer defenses against a direct loan financer. In at
least two cases, however, it has been held that defenses which a
consumer may assert against a dealer are not good as against a
financer from whom the consumer obtained a direct loan.3 1
28. UCC § 9-206(1) provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a dif-
ferent rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agree-
ment by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert against
an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against
the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes
his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice
of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which
may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negoti-
able instrument under the Article on Commercial Paper(Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction signs
both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes
such an agreement.
29. Littlefield, supra note 1, at 278. See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J.
101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); C.I.T. Corp. v. Hetland, 143 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.
1966). In Geiger Fin. Co. v. Graham, 123 Ga. App. 771, 182 S.E.2d
521 (1971), the sales contract and promissory note were all printed
on the same document. The court denied the financer holder in due
course status because the paper was not a negotiable instrument. The
waiver-of-defense clause was therefore invalidated; the court would
not enforce the clause if the effect was to render a writing negotiable
which was otherwise non-negotiable. The Geiger Finance case is the
subject of a casenote at 23 MERcER L. REV. 673 (1972).
30. Comment, supra note 15, at 98. See, e.g., Mohawk Nat'l Bank v.
Chalifaux, 33 Misc. 2d 987, 227 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1962).
31. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (La. Ct. App. 1971);
Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v. Beebe, 123 Vt. 317, 187 A.2d 502(1963). In Note, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1423-32 (1972), the author
analyzes the use of three existing legal theories to justify preservation
of defenses in the direct loan case. Each of the three theories is pred-
icated to a certain extent on a close connection between the seller
and the lender. First, the author discusses judicial precedent for ar-
guing that the lender is a party to the sales transaction either as
the seller's principal or as the seller's partner or co-venturer. Sec-
ond, the author discusses the possibility of a judicial establishment
of a direct duty of the lender to the borrower to disclose his knowl-
edge of a related sale when he is or should be aware that the bor-
rower is likely to be cheated. Breach of such a duty could amount
to fraud in the solicitation of the loan. Finally, the author suggests
there may be precedent for an action by the consumer for the lend-
er's negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care that he is not
financing seller misconduct.
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B. Legislative Response
A number of state legislatures have enacted measures restrict-
ing or prohibiting the use of negotiable notes or waiver-of-defense
clauses in consumer transactions.3 2  The legislative response has
taken a variety of approaches and there is very little uniformity
among the states. Some states have restricted the use of or pro-
hibited altogether both negotiable instruments and waiver claus-
es,3 3 while other states have barred one but not the other.34 Waiver
clauses are enforceable under some statutes if notice of the assign-
ment is given to the consumer, and if within a prescribed period
he fails to notify the assignee (financer) of facts giving rise to
any claim or defense he may have. 35  The types of transactions
in which either waiver clauses or negotiable instruments, or both,
have been prohibited range from all retail installment sales to such
specific ones as home improvement transactions and motor vehicle
sales.36
32. For a discussion of the variety of legislative measures, and citations
to many of the state statutes, see Navin, Waiver of Defense Clauses
in Consumer Contracts, 48 N.C. L. REV. 505, 531-32 (1970).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.2 (West 1973) (invalidating waiver clause in
retail installment contracts); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1810.7 (West 1973)
(barring negotiability of retail installment accounts); HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 476-18 (1968) (prohibits negotiability and waiver clauses
in retail installment sales); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403 (1) (McKin-
ney 1962) (prohibiting negotiability in situation involving retail in-
stallment contracts and obligations), § 403(3) (g) (McKinney 1962)
(making waivers ineffective when contract is executory and is for
services); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.14.020 (Supp. 1972) (prohibit-
ing negotiability in retail-installment transactions), § 63.14.150 (Supp.
1972) (prohibiting waivers in retail installment contracts). If L.B.
325, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. had been enacted, as introduced, it would
have fallen in this category of statutes.
34. Some statutes bar only waiver of defense clauses. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.10.140 (1962) (waivers barred in retail installment sales); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 51-07-09 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-16-5 (Supp.
1973). Some states have prohibited only negotiability. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1969); PA. STAT. tit. 69, § 615 (G) (1965)
(negotiability prohibited in home-improvement transactions); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-27-6 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455
(1971).
35. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2983.5 (West Supp. 1969) (motor-vehicle sales only);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4312 (Supp. 1970) (retail installment sales,
15 day notice period); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.416(115) (Supp. 1973)
(home-improvement installment contracts); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §
403(3) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1969) (retail installment sales); PA.
STAT. tit. 69, § 1402 (Supp. 1973-1974) (goods and services installment
sales, 45-day notice period), tit. 73, § 500-208 (Supp. 1973-1974)
(home-improvement transaction, 15 day notice requirement); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5069-6.07 (1971).
36. The parenthetical notations in notes 33, 34 and 35 supra indicate the
transactions to which the statutes apply.
CONSUMER SALES
Some authorities perceive a shift from the three-party indirect
loan transaction to direct loan or lender credit card financing.37
This may be partially attributable to legislation in several of the
states which eliminates negotiability in some or all consumer trans-
actions. Most of the statutes apply only to consumer credit "sales"
and not to "loans."3 8  The lender credit card transaction is gen-
erally classified as a loan from the financer.39 By switching to
direct loan financing, financers can still insulate themselves from
consumer defenses. Some states, however, have enacted legislation
to preserve consumer defenses in the direct loan and the lender
credit card cases. At least five jurisdictions, Arizona,40 Massachu-
setts, 41 New York,42 Rhode Island" and Wisconsin,44 have statutes
37. Littlefield, supra note 1, at 293.
38. For the Uniform Consumer Credit Code provisions, see note 66 infra,
and for the treatment of this issue by L.B. 325, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess.
(1974), see note 56 infra.
39. Id.
40. Amrz. REv. STAT. AN. § 44-145 (Supp. 1973-1974). This statute per-
mits the consumer to assert defenses against a holder or an assignee
of an instrument "which evidences the obligation of a natural person
as buyer, lessee, or borrower in connection with the purchase or lease
of consumer goods." (emphasis added). The consumer must send no-
tice of his defense by certified mail to the seller within 90 days of
receiving the goods or services. Section 44-145B (3) provides that the
statute is inapplicable to transactions where the note evidences a loan
"which was not arranged by the seller or lessor." "Arranged" is de-
fined as follows:
"Arranged" means to provide or offer to provide a loan
which is or will be extended to another person under a busi-
ness or other relationship pursuant to which the person ar-
ranging such loan receives or will receive a fee, compensa-
tion, or other consideration for such service or has knowledge
of the terms of the loan and participates in the preparation
of the instruments required in connection with the extension
of the loan.
Id. § 44-145C(2).
41. MAss. Gm. LAws ANN. ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1972). The Massachu-
setts statute is substantially the same as the NATIONAL CoNsUMER ACT
First Final Draft, Official Text, 1970 [hereinafter cited as NCA] §
2.407, infra note 71. The Massachusetts act omits NCA § 2.407(2) (f).
42. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 253-54 (McKinney Supp. 1973-1974). This
statute is also patterned after the NCA provision, but there are sig-
nificant differences. The lender must have "knowingly participated
in or was directly connected with" the sale before the statute applies
to the direct loan transaction. The New York statute lists three fact
situations (the NCA lists seven) which create a rebuttable presump-
tion that the creditor shall have knowingly participated in or shall
have been directly connected with a consumer sale--() lender re-
lated to the seller, (2) seller prepared the loan documents, (3) lender
supplied forms used by the consumer. Under the NCA mode], any
of these three fact situations, plus the four others in § 2.407 conclu-
sively establishes that the creditor participated in or was connected
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designed to preserve defenses in the direct loan transaction. 45 Each
of the statutes require some connection between the dealer and
the direct lender.46 Arizona,47 California,48 Massachusetts, 49 Ver-
with the consumer sale. The New York statute does not apply to
transactions involving the purchase of an automobile.
43. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 6-27-5 (Supp. 1972), provides that if any
contract
requires or involves the execution of a promissory note by
a retail buyer in connection with an extension of credit by
the retail seller, or by a creditor to whom the retail buyer
was referred by the retail seller and to whom the retail seller
regularly, as part of the ordinary conduct of its business, and
with the actual knowledge of such creditor, refers retail buy-
ers for credit, the words "non-negotiable consumer note" shall
be placed prominently thereon, and an assignee of such note
with the words "non-negotiable consumer note" appearing
prominently thereon shall take such note subject to the
claims and defenses permitted under section 6A-3-306 of the
general laws irrespective of whether or not the assignee qual-
ifies as a "holder in due course" as defined in section 6A-
3-302 of the general laws.
For an analysis of the knotty problems of interpretation that this stat-
ute might produce, see Littlefield, supra note 8, at 482-83.
44. Wis. STAT. § 422.408 (1971). The Wisconsin legislation integrates regu-
lation of consumer sales and loans. The relevant sections apply to a
"consumer credit transaction" defined as a "consumer transaction be-
tween a merchant and a customer in which real or personal property,
services or money is acquired on credit . .. ." The term includes
consumer credit sales, consumer loans, consumer leases and transac-
tions pursuant to open-end credit plans. Wis. STAT. § 422.301(10)
(1971). The Wisconsin statute is patterned after NCA § 2.407, infra
note 61. Wis. STAT. § 422.408(1) (1971) provides that "the lender
in an interlocking consumer loan is subject to the claims and defenses
the consumer may have against the seller or lessor in the consumer
transaction for which the proceeds of the loan are used." An "inter-
locking loan" is defined in Wis. STAT. § 422.408(3) (1971).
45. For an analysis of the scope and potential problems of interpretation
of each of these statutes, see Littlefield, supra note 8, at 478-92. Lit-
tlefield suggests that perhaps VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (1971),
fits into this category. It provides:
The holder of a promissory note or instrument or other evi-
dence of indebtedness of a consumer delivered in connection
with a contract shall take or hold that note, instrument or
evidence subject to all defenses of such consumer which
would be available to the consumer in an action on a simple
contract, and all rights available to him under this chapter.
46. For the various requirements of the degree of connection required,
see notes 40-44 supra.
47. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-145 (Supp. 1973). For a discussion of the
Arizona statute, see note 40 supra. Section 44-145B(1) provides that
the statute is inapplicable to lender credit card sales of perishable
consumer goods or consumer services. Furthermore, the statute does
not apply to credit card transactions made out of the state as pro-
vided in § 44-145B (2).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.90 (West 1973). California has this provision
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mont 5° and Wisconsin 5' have statutes preserving defenses in lender
credit card transactions. 52  All of the credit card statutes, except
that of Massachusetts, are applicable only to intrastate transac-
tions.
The Nebraska Legislature's L.B. 325"3 would have eliminated
negotiability in all consumer credit sales and consumer leases. Any
promissory note, instrument, or other evidence of indebtedness of
the buyer issued pursuant to a contract for a consumer credit sale
between a retail buyer and a retail seller would not have been a
negotiable instrument.54 Furthermore, waiver of defenses clauses
would have been of no force or effect. 55 A special definition of
lender credit card was provided; but apparently, the lender would
not have been subject to consumer defenses because a lender credit
card transaction was not included in the definition of consumer
credit sale, or consumer lease.56
for credit card transactions, but its statute does not affect direct loans.
The California statute, although similar to the NCA § 2.407, infra note
71, contains three important limitations on the assertability of de-
fenses. (1) Defenses are assertable only if the purchase price of fhe
item exceeds $50. (2) The statute applies only to purchases made
in the state. (3) The amount to which a defense may be asserted
is limited to that amount of the purchase price which is still, at the
time of notice of the defense outstanding on the balance.
49. See note 41 supra.
50. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1305 (1971) provides:
With respect to transactions in Vermont charged to a bank
credit card account established by a Vermont bank; the de-
fenses preserved by section 2455 of Title 9, shall be available
to the cardholder as against the bank in any action or pro-
ceding to enforce collection of said account by a Vermont
bank.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (1971), is quoted at note 45 supra. The
applicability of tit. 8, § 1305 is somewhat in question because of its
relation to tit. 9, § 2455. See Littlefield, supra note 8, at 490-91.
51. Wis. STAT. § 422.408(3) (f) (1971), supra note 44. The credit card
transaction is defined as a consumer loan transaction by WIs. STAT.
§ 422.408 (2).
52. See note 45 supra.
53. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
54. L.B. 325 § 2, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1974).
55. Id. § 3.
56. Id. § 1(6) defined a "lender credit card:"
Lender credit card shall mean an arrangement or loan agree-
ment, other than a seller credit card, pursuant to which a
lender gives a buyer the privilege of using a credit card, let-
ter of credit, or other credit confirmation, or identification
in transactions out of which debt arises by the lender's pay-
ment or agreement to pay the buyer's obligations;
The lender credit card transaction was specifically excluded from the
definition of "consumer credit sale" and "consumer lease." Id. § 1(4)
defined a "consumer credit sale:"
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(1) Uniform Consumer Credit Code
One attempt at uniformity in legislative response to the issue
of preservation of consumer defenses is the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (hereinafter the "UCCC"), adopted in 1968 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. At
the date of this writing, seven states have enacted the UCCC, 
7
and it is under some phase of consideration in the legislature of
nearly every state. 58
UCCC section 2.403 prohibits the use of negotiable instruments
in consumer credit sales.59 The only limitation on the prohibition
Consumer credit sale shall mean, except for a sale in which
the seller allows the buyer to purchase goods or services pur-
suant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement, a sale
of goods or services in which: (a) Credit is granted by a
seller who regularly engages as a seller in credit transactions
of the same kind, (b) the buyer is a natural person other
than an organization, (c) the goods or services purchased are
primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricultural
purpose, (d) either the debt is payable in installments or
a credit service charge is made, and (e) the amount financed
does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars;
"Consumer lease" was defined at id. § 1 (11):
Consumer lease shall mean a lease of goods (a) which a les-
sor regularly engaged in the business of leasing makes a nat-
ural person who takes under the lease primarily for a per-
sonal, family, household, or agricultural purpose, (b) in
which the amount payable under the lease does not exceed
twenty-five thousand dollars, and (c) which is for a term
exceeding four months, but shall not include a lease made
pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement.
57. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-1-101 to -9-103 (Cum. Supp. 1971); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 28-31-101 to -39-108 (Cum. Supp. 1973); IND. BURN'S
STAT. §§ 19-21-101 to -26-203 (Cum. Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 162-1-102 to -9-102 (Cum. Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A,
§§ 1-101 to 9-103 (1972); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-1-101 to -9-103
(Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-101 to -9-103 (Cum. Supp.
1973). Each of these statutes contains some variations; for an article
discussing these variations, see Black, State Variations of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code: The Case for Legislative Restraint, 48 DENVER
L.J. 239 (1971).
58. For the current status of UCCC legislation in any state, see CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 4771.
59. UCCC § 2.403 (1969 Official Text) [hereinafter cited as UCCC]
provides:
In a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a
sale or lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, the seller
or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other than a
check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee.
A holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable instru-
ment with notice that it is issued in violation of this section.
A holder in due course is not subject to the liabilities set
forth in the provisions on the effect of violations on rights
of parties (Section 5.202) and the provisions on civil actions by
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is that a person who has no knowledge that the note has been
issued in violation of section 2.403, and is otherwise a holder in
due course, may enforce the obligation free of consumer defenses.60
The original version of the UCCC provided two alternative sec-
tions concerning the enforceability of waiver of defense clauses.0'
Administrator (Section 6.113).
Among the states that have adopted the UCCC, there are certain local
variations. COLO. REv. STAT. ANx. § 73-2-403 (Cum. Supp. 1971) pro-
vides:
(1) If a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other
than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural purpose,
involves the execution of a promissory note or instrument
or other evidence of indebtedness of the buyer, or lessee, such
note, instrument, or evidence of indebtedness shall have
printed on the face thereof the words 'consumer paper', and
such note, instrument, or evidence of indebtedness with the
words 'consumer paper' printed thereon shall be a negotiable
instrument within the meaning of article 3 of chapter 155,
C.R.S. 1963, ninety days after the date of such instrument.(2) Notwithstanding the absence of such notice on a
note, instrument, or evidence of indebtedness arising out of
a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, and notwithstand-
ing an agreement to the contrary, an assignee of the rights
of the seller or lessor is subject to all claims and defenses
of the buyer or lessee against the seller or lessor arising out
of the sale or lease, up to and including the amount owing
to the assignee at the time the claim or defense is asserted
against the assignee.(3) Failure to imprint the words 'consumer paper' on
such note, instrument, or evidence of indebtedness shall sub-ject the seller, lessor, or other responsible person to the lia-
bilities set forth in the provisions on the effect of violations
on rights of parties (section 73-5-202) and the provisions on
civil actions by the administrator (section 73-6-113).
IDAHO CODE AN. § 28-32-403 (Cum. Supp. 1973) provides:
With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease,
other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural pur-
pose, the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instru-
ment other than a currently dated check as evidence of the
obligation of the buyer or lessee.
The Kansas version of the UCCC does not contain § 2.403.
60. The official comment to UCCC § 2.403 states:
Since the prohibition against certain negotiable instru-
ments in consumer financing will be well known in the fi-
nancial community after enactment of this Act, professional
financers buying consumer paper will normally not qualify
as holders in due course with respect to instruments taken
by dealers in violation of this section and negotiated to them.
To qualify as a holder in due course all requirements of UCC
Section 3-302 must be satisfied. However, it is possible that
in rare cases second or third takers may not know of an in-
strument's consumer origin; in this unusual situation the pol-
icy favoring negotiability is upheld in order not to cast a
cloud over negotiable instruments generally. A person who
takes a negotiable instrument in violation of this section is
subject to Sections 5.202 and 6.113. Compare Unico v. Owen,
50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
61. For a discussion of Alternatives A and B, see Hogan, supra note 15,
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Section 2.404, Alternative A rendered waiver clauses unenforce-
able altogether, 62 while under Alternative B, waiver clauses were
enforceable, provided the financer notified the consumer of the as-
signment, and within three months thereafter, the consumer did not
notify the financer of any claim or defense. 63 Many consumer ad-
at 686-91; Jordan & Warren, supra note 15, at 436-37; Littlefield, su-
pra note 1, at 288-92; Murphy, supra note 15, at 682-85.
62. UCCC § 2.404, Alternative A provides:
With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease,
other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural pur-
pose, an assignee of the rights of the seller or lessor is sub-ject to all claims and defenses of the buyer or lessee against
the seller or lessor arising out of the sale or lease notwith-
standing an agreement to the contrary, but the assignee's lia-
bility under this section may not exceed the amount owing
to the assignee at the time the claim or defense is asserted
against the assignee. Rights of the buyer or lessee under
this section can only be asserted as a matter of defense to
or set-off against a claim by the assignee.
Idaho adopted Alternative A with extensive modification to read:
When assignee not subject to defenses.(1) With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer
lease, (other than one primarily for an agricultural purpose),
an assignee of the rights of the seller or lessor is subject
to all claims and defenses of the buyer or lessee against the
seller or lessor arising out of the sale or lease notwithstand-
ing that(a) there is an agreement to the contrary, or
(b) the assignee is a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument issued in violation of the provisions on prohibition
of certain negotiable instruments (section 2.403).(2) The assignee's liability under subsection (1) may not
exceed the amount owing to the assignee with respect to the
sale or lease at the time the assignee has notice of a claim
or defense of the buyer or lessee. If debts arising from two
or more consumer credit sales, other than pursuant to a re-
volving charge account, or consumer leases are consolidated,
payments received after the consolidation are deemed, for the
purpose of determining the amount owing the assignee with
respect to a sale or lease, to have been first applied to the
payment of debts arising from the sales or leases first made;
if the debts consolidated arose from sales or leases made on
the same day, payments are deemed to have been first applied
to the smallest debt. Payments received upon a revolving
charge account are deemed, for the purpose of determining
the amount owing the assignee with respect to a sale, to have
been first applied to the payment of credit service charges
in the order of their entry to the account and then to the
payment of debts in the order in which the entries to the
account showing the debts were made.
(3) An agreement may not provide for greater rights for
an assignee than this section permits.
IDAHo CODE ANN. § 28-32-404 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
63. UCCC § 2A04, Alternative B provides:
(1) With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer
lease, other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural
purpose, an agreement by the buyer or lessee not to assert
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vocates were disturbed that the UCCC had not taken a stronger
position against the waiver clause; consequently, the alternative
provisions have been the subject of much controversy. In the lat-
est redraft of the UCCC, Alternative B was rejected.64
Under both Alternative A and Alternative B of UCCC section
2.404, there are two limitations on the financer's liability. First,
the financer's liability may not exceed the amount owing to him
at the time the consumer brings his claim against the financer.
against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of the sale
or lease is enforceable only by an assignee not related to
the seller or lessee who acquires the buyer's or lessee's con-
tract in good faith and for value, who gives the buyer or
lessee notice of the assignment as provided in this section
and who, within 3 months after the mailing of the notice
of assignment, receives no written notice of the facts giving
rise to the buyer's or lessee's claim or defense. This agree-
ment is enforceable only with respect to claims or defenses
which have arisen before the end of the 3-month period after
notice was mailed. The notice of assignment shall be in
writing and addressed to the buyer or lessee at his address
as stated in the contract, identify the contract, describe thegoods or services, state the names of the seller or lessor and
buyer or lessee, the name and address of the assignee, the
amount payable by the buyer or lessee and the number,
amounts and due dates of the instalments, and contain a con-
spicuous notice to the buyer or lessee that he has 3 months
within which to notify the assignee in writing of any com-
plaints, claims or defenses he may have against the seller
or lessor and that if written notification of the complaints,
claims or defenses is not received by the assignee within the
3-month period, the assignee will have the right to enforce
the contract free of any claims or defenses the buyer or lessee
may have against the seller or lessor which have arisen be-fore the end of the 3-month period after notice was mailed.(2) An assignee does not acquire a buyer's or lessee's
contract in good faith within the meaning of subsection (1)
if the assignee has knowledge or, from his course of dealing
with the seller or lessor or his records, notice of substantial
complaints by other buyers or lessees of the seller's or les-
sor's failure or refusal to perform his contracts with them
and of the seller's or lessor's failure to remedy his defaults
within a reasonable time after the assignee notifies him of
the complaints.(3) To the extent that under this section an assignee is
subject to claims or defenses of the buyer or lessee against
the seller or lessor, the assignee's liability under this section
may not exceed the amount owing to the.assignee at the time
the claim or defense is asserted against the assignee and
rights of the buyer or lessee under this section can only be
asserted as a matter of defense to or set-off against a claim
by the assignee.
Indiana, Oklahoma and Wyoming adopted Alternative B, but
amended the three-month periods to 60 days, 30 days and 45 days
respectively. Colorado reserved § 2.404 for future use, and Kansas
did not enact either Alternative A or B of § 2.404.
64. UCCC WORKING REDArr No. 4 § 3.404.
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In other words, the consumer may not recover the payments he
made to the financer prior to the assertion of his defense. In addi-
tion to the finality of payment rule, the consumer's claim may
be asserted only as a matter of defense to or set-off against a claim
by the financer. In the most recent version of the UCCC, the
"defense or set-off" language was deleted while the limitation of
financer liability to the amount owing to the assignee at the time
the assignee has notice of the defense was retained. 65
Because UCCC sections 2.403 and 2.404 apply only to "consumer
credit sales" they do not preserve consumer defenses in the direct
loan or the lender credit card cases.66 However, another change
in the new draft of the UCCC is to allow the consumer to assert
his defenses against a direct lender in certain enumerated situations
-(a) the consumer is referred by the dealer to a lender for a
commission, (b) the dealer and the lender are related, (c) the deal-
er guarantees the loan, (d) the lender directly supplies the dealer
with the contract documents, or (e) the loan is conditioned upon
the consumer's purchase of the goods or services from a particular
dealer.67
65. UCCC WoRKXRG REDRAFT No. 4 § 3.404(2). L.B. 325 § 3, 83d Neb.
Leg. Sess. (1974), incorporated the finality of payment rule. It pro-
vided:
An assignee's liability under this act shall not exceed the
amount owing to the assignee at the time the claim or de-
fense is asserted against such assignee.
66. UCCC § 2.104 defines "consumer credit sale:"
"[C]onsumer credit sale" is a sale of goods, services, or an
interest in land in which(a) credit is granted by a person who regularly engages
as a seller in credit transactions of the same kind,(b) the buyer is a person other than an organization,(c) the goods, services, or interest in land are purchased
primarily for a personal, family, household, or agricultural
purpose,(d) either the debt is payable in instalments or a credit
service charge is made, and(e) with respect to a sale of goods or services, the
amount financed does not exceed $25,000.
There are two provisions in the UCCC which remove the credit card
transaction from the scope of the prohibition against negotiability and
the prohibition against waiver clauses. UCCC § 2.104(2) (a) pro-
vides:
Unless the sale is made subject to this Act by agreement(Section 2.601), "consumer credit sale" does not include a
sale in which the seller allows the buyer to purchase goods
or services pursuant to a lender credit card or similar ar-
rangement.
UCCC § 3.106:
"Loan" includes(3) the creation of debt pursuant to a lender credit card
or similar arrangement.
67. UCCC Wonaxn EDRAFT No. 4 § 3.405 provides:
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(2) National Consumer Act
The National Consumer Act (hereinafter the "NCA"),68 un-
doubtedly the most determinedly pro-consumer of all recent statu-
tory proposals, completely abrogates the holder in due course doc-
trine by providing that no creditor may have a consumer sign a
note payable "to order" or "to bearer."' 6 9  The NCA subjects an
(1) A lender, other than the issuer of a lender credit
card, who, with respect to a particular transaction, makes a
consumer loan for the purpose of enabling a consumer to buy
or lease from a particular seller or lessee goods or services[other than primarily for an agrcultural purpose,] is subject
to all claims and defenses of the consumer against the seller
or lessor arising from that sale or lease of the goods and
and services if
(a) the lender knows that the seller or lessor ar-
ranged, for a commission, brokerage, or referral fee, for
the extension of credit by the lender;
(b) the lender is a person related to the seller or les-
sor unless the relationship is remote or is not a factor in
the transaction;
(c) the seller or lessor guarantees the loan or other-
wise assumes the risk of loss by the lender upon the loan;(d) the lender directly supplies the seller or lessor
with the contract document used by the consumer to evi-
dence the loan, and the seller or lessor significantly par-
ticipates in the preparation of the document; or
(e) the loan is conditioned upon the consumer's pur-
chase or lease of the goods or services from the particular
Seller or lessor, but the lender's payment of proceeds of
loan to the seller or lessor does not in itself establish
that the loan was not conditioned.
(2) A claim or defense of a buyer or lessee specified in
subsection (1) may be asserted against the lender only to
the extent of the amount owing to the lender with respect
to the sale or lease at the time the lender has notice of the
claim or defense.
(3) For the purpose of determining the amount owing
to the lender with respect to the sale or lease
(a) payments received by the lender after the consol-idation of two or more consumer loans, other than pursu-
ant to open end credit, are deemed to have been first ap-
plied to the payment of the loans first made; if the loans
consolidated arose from loans made on the same day, pay-
ments are deemed to have been first applied to the
smaller or smallest loan or loans; and
(b) payments received upon an open end credit ac-
count are deemed to have been first applied to the pay-
ment of finance charges in the order of their entry to the
account and then to the payment of debts in the order
in which the entries of the debts are made to the account.
(4) An agreement may not limit or waive the claims ordefenses of a consumer under this section.
68. For a discussion of the NCA and the original UCCC, see Moo, New
Consumer Credit Legislation: Which Approach-the UCCC or the
NCA?, 2 URBAN LAw. 439 (1970).
69. NCA § 2.405 provides:
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assignee of an installment contract to all the claims and defenses
of the consumer arising out of a consumer credit transaction inspite
of a waiver clause30 The NCA preserves consumer defenses in
many direct loan transactions by providing in section 2.407 (1) that
the lender is subject to such defenses if he "participated in or was
connected with the consumer sale or lease transaction."' 71 In order
(1) No lender, seller or lessor shall take or otherwise
arrange for the consumer to sign an instrument payable "to
order or to bearer" as evidence of the credit obligation of
the consumer in a consumer credit transaction or a consumer
lease.(2) Any holder of an instrument, contract or other writ-
ing evidencing an obligation of the consumer takes it subject
to all claims and defenses of the consumer up to and includ-
ing the amount of the transaction total arising out of the
transaction whether or not it is payable "to order or to
bearer."(3) Taking or otherwise arranging for the consumer to
sign an instrument in violation of this Section shall be sub-ject to the provisions of Section 5.304.
The official comment to NCA § 2.405 explains its significant differ-
ence from UCCC § 2.403:
1. In order to avoid the doctrine of "holder in due
course," the Uniform Consumer Credit Code pretends to pro-
hibit the use of negotiable instruments in consumer credit
sales. It acknowldges that such instruments can still be used
in violation and that there can be holders in due course. Fur-
ther, it does not apply even this restriction to consumer loans.
2. This section prohibits the taking of instruments pay-
able "to order or to bearer." Under Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code this destroys the negotiability of such in-
struments, although they are still subject to other provisions
of Article 3. This gives some certainty to the law of trans-
fer of such instruments, even though there can be no holder
in due course under Section 3-805 of that statute. Subsec-
tion (2) of this section subjects a holder taking an instrument
in violation to all defenses of the consumer. Such holder
is liable up to the "transaction total", which is the total
amount of the transaction at its inception. Thus, this Act
destroys once and for all the doctrine of "holder in due
course."
70. NCA § 2.406 provides:
Notwithstanding any term or agreement to the contrary,
an assignee of the rights of the creditor is subject to all
claims and defenses of the consumer arising out of a con-
sumer credit transaction or consumer lease.
71. NCA § 2.407 provides;
(1) The creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be
subject to all of the claims and defenses of the consumer
up to the total amount financed, arising from the consumer
sale or lease for which the proceeds of the loan are used,
if the creditor participated in or was connected with the con-
sumer sale or lease transaction.(2) Without limiting the scope of subsection (1), the
creditor participates in or is connected with a consumer sale
or lease transaction when:(a) the creditor is a person related to the seller or
lessor; or
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to determine when the lender "participated in or was connected
with" the sales transaction, NCA section 2.407(2) sets out a num-
ber of situations in which the connection is conclusively es-
tablished, including where the creditor was the issuer of a credit
card.7 2 The Massachusetts legislation, referred to above, was sub-
stantially patterned after the NCA.73
Ill. EFFECT OF LEGISLATION
It is quite obvious that legislatures have responded to the prob-
lem of preservation of consumer defenses with a variety of meas-
ures. Despite the large volume of commentary on this issue, there
is a dearth of empirical data which a legislature might look to
in drafting a statute. There are no statistics which identify the
need for the legislation or more specifically in which segments of
the consumer credit industry such a need might exist. Further-
more, there is little available information which analyzes the im-
pact of the "protective" legislation on the financer, the dealer or
the consumer. While the controversy over the legislation has cen-
tered on the balance between the need for consumer protection
on the one hand and the fear of a detrimental effect on the deal-
er's ability to market consumer paper on the other, neither side
has statistical information to support its respective position.
A. Commentators Discuss Impact
Nonetheless, the commentators have not necessarily been silent
on the issue of the impact of the legislation. In the early 1950s,
it was argued by at least one authority that the consumer's inability
to assert his defenses against a third party financer was an in-
(b) the seller or lessor prepares documents used in
connection with the loan; or
(c) the creditor supplies forms to the seller or lessor
used by the consumer in obtaining the loan; or
(d) the creditor makes 20 or more loans in any cal-
endar year, the proceeds of which are used in
transactions with the same seller or lessor, or
with a person related to the same seller or lessor;
or
(e) the consumer is referred to the creditor by the
seller or lessor; or
Cf) the creditor, directly or indirectly pays the seller
or lessor any consideration whether or not it is
in connection with the particular transaction; or
(g) the creditor is the issuer of a credit card which
may be used by the consumer in the consumer
sale or lease as a result of a prior agreement be-
tween the issuer and the seller or lessor.
72. Id.
73. Note 41 supra.
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teresting theoretical problem but not a very large problem factual-
ly.74 This was based on the feeling that there was only an in-
finitesimal number of installment sales transactions where the con-
sumer was harmed by not being able to assert his defenses against
the financer. 75 Most sales, it was argued, satisfied the consumer
and most deficiencies were cured by responsible sellers.7 6  Some
authorities, more recently, have used this same major premise to
argue that there is no difference in the availability of financing
nor the profits of sellers or financers among those states which
allow negotiable instruments and waiver clauses and those states
which do not.77 These same authorities, however, generally favor
preservation of consumer defenses. Even if no protection is needed
in the vast majority of cases, there are a significant number of
consumers, particularly the low income segment, who do need the
protection.7
8
74. Kripke, supra note 15, 59 YALE L.J. at 1215-16 (1950) stated:
This problem is indeed an interesting one, theoretically, but
the intriguing theoretical situation makes the problem loom
larger than it is factually. The purchaser on time is no more
likely to be dissatisfied with his purchase than any other pur-
chaser. In the whole vast range of consumer purchase trans-
actions, the cases of customer complaint, justified or unjusti-
fied, are infinitesimal. Even in the case of justified dissatis-
faction, the seller is ordinarily able and willing to make ad-justment. If he is not willing, he is, of course, legally re-
sponsible either in a direct suit by the purchaser or at the
insistence of the third party holder of the obligation if the
latter has been unable to collect because of the successful
assertion of defenses based on dissatisfaction with the mer-
chandise. Therefore, the question is merely procedural, ex-
cept in the comparatively few cases where the seller is un-
available or insolvent.
Kripke more recently has written in favor of the preservation of con-
sumer defenses, see Kripke, supra note 15, 68 CoLum. L. REv. at 470-
73 (1968).
75. Kripke, supra note 15, 59 YALE L.J. at 470-73.
76. Id.
77. Felsenfeld, supra note 6, at 551-52; Hartman & Walker, The Holder
in Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer, 77 CoM. L.J. 116, 123-
24 (1972).
78. Id. Project-Legislative Regulation of Retail Installment Financing,
7 U.C.L.A.L. Ruv. 623, 750 (1960), states:
It has been suggested that from both the buyer's and fi-
nancing agency's point of view, the issues of negotiability and
waiver of defense have been greatly exaggerated in impor-
tance. It is said that the financing agency, prior to as-
serting its rights against the buyer, will attempt to settle
honest claims by having the dealer make appropriate adjust-
ments, thereby preserving the latter's reputation in the com-
munity. Failing this, resort will be had to the dealer's re-
serve account or his recourse indorsement. Only in cases
where the dealer is insolvent, or where the financing agency
and he are united in interest, will the buyer be called upon
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Probably the most widely accepted prediction of the impact of
the preservation of consumer defenses is that financers will be
more careful about the paper that they purchase, and as a result
financers will screen out those marginal sellers with whom con-
sumers have had problems in the past.79 Added screening proce-
dures, it is predicted, will increase the cost of purchasing and
servicing installment paper originated by dealers.8 0 Commercial
banks will have a tendency to loan money directly to consumers
and will have a disincentive to purchase dealer paper,81 while in-
dependent finance companies may diversify away from consumer
paper.8 2 All of this, it is thought, will add up to some curtailment
in the availability of credit and some increase in the cost of credit
to the consumer.8 3
Despite the acknowledgement that credit may be more difficult
to obtain and that it may become more expensive, "the complete
weight of academic thinking" is in favor of preserving consumer
defenses. 8 4 The legislation has been justified on the basis of two
theories. First, as between the financer and the consumer, the
financer is in a better position to prevent losses to the consumer
by screening out thinly capitalized or fraudulent dealers.8 5 The
financer can simply refuse to purchase the paper from these deal-
ers, and the end result will be that the only sources of installment
credit will be from adequately capitalized or reputable dealers. A
second and independent justification is that of the financers ability
to allocate the risk of consumer loss back to the dealers and con-
to make good his promise even though the seller has not per-
formed his part of the bargain. Thus, it is argued, only in
an infinitesimal number of retail installment sale transactions
is the buyer harmed by his agreement to waive his defenses
or by having given a negotiable instrument.
Conceding that no protection is needed in the vast major-
ity of cases, protection in the remaining ones must come from
the legislature, for it is also agreed that the buyer is unable
to provide it for himself. Moreover, to say that the problem
is not substantial is to look only to the reported decisions,
few in number. It is to overlook the larger number of cases
which either never reach an appellate level or never go to
trial. The buyer who is being protected by retail installment
legislation is normally one who cannot afford the luxury of
a lawsuit and may, therefore, be forced as a practical matter
to submit to the demands of the financing agency though he
has an otherwise valid claim.
79. Shay, supra note 15, at 761-62.




84. Kripke, supra note 15, 68 CoLum. L. REv. at 470.
85. Id. at 472. Littlefield, supra note 1, at 280-83.
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sequently assure that the costs of doing business are carried by
those engaged in the enterprise.8" Furthermore, the financer can
spread the cost of risk allocation over several transactions. The
individual consumer has no ability to shift risks or allocate costs,
and he must absorb all his own losses. It is strenuously argued
by some commentators that these theories also justify the preser-
vation of consumer defenses in the direct loan and the credit card
transactions.8 7
B. The Yale Project 88
In 1969 a group of Yale law students, recognizing the lack of
empirical data by which to determine the impact of the restriction
on negotiability on the consumer credit industry, conducted a study
of the home improvement business in Connecticut and the effects
of certain provisions of the Connecticut Home Solicitation Sales
Act of 196789 (hereinafter "the Act"). Among other things, the
Act contained a provision that the obligation to pay, arising from
a home solicitation sale, cannot be evidenced by a negotiable in-
strument. The study analyzed separately the impact of that pro-
vision on the financer, the dealer and the consumer.
(1) The Financer
The study reported "the clearest consequence of the Act has
been a marked reduction in institutional financing of business en-
gaged in door-to-door sales."90  The reduction was explained by
analyzing the financer's criteria for dealer selection and the terms
of the financing arrangements. Screening of dealers by financers
became more regular and more intensive after the Act became ef-
fective.91 The decrease in institutional financing was partially ex-
plained by the difficulty that dealers had in complying with the
86. Kripke, supra note 15, 68 COLum. L. REv. at 472. Littlefield, supra
note 1, at 283-85.
87. Littlefield, supra note 8; Note, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1972).
88. Note, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
89. CoNN. GFN. STAT. ANN. § 42-134 to -143 (Supp. 1968).
90. Note 88 supra, at 637.
91. Id. at 638. Financers reported that they had screening procedures
prior to the Act. Financers inquired into such information as the
number of customer complaints about a dealer and the number of
past defaults by a dealer's customers. Financial statements were of-
ten required. After the Act became effective, the screening proce-
dures became more intensive and more regular. Financers now re-
ported checking several possible references such as suppliers or other
banks and businesses that might be acquainted with the dealer.
Some were even checking the dealer's work.
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generally more rigorous standards set by financers. An additional
factor in the decrease was the new obligations which financers re-
quired of dealers.92 Foremost among the new terms of financing
agreements was the repurchase agreement whereby the dealer
promised to repurchase the consumer's note from the financer
should the consumer for any reason refuse payment.
9 3
A second major consequence of the Act was that credit became
generally more expensive. The increase in cost was not manifested
by higher interest rates but in less direct ways.94 The study indi-
cated one way in which financers were "regularly" taking a greater
return on home improvement transactions than they did prior to
the Act. Traditionally, upon taking an assignment from a dealer,
financers would give the dealer incentive payments, a supplement
to the amount of the sales price. The use of incentive payments
declined.95 Some financers discontinued the practice and others
either reduced the percentage of the payment or the number of
dealers to whom the payment was available.9 6
Under the Connecticut Act, financers who loan money directly
to consumers, who, in turn, purchase goods from the dealer for
cash, are not affected by the elimination of negotiability in install-
ment credit transactions. Because the direct loan transaction of-
fered financers insulation from consumer defenses, many financers
shifted their emphasis to seeking direct loan customers rather than
soliciting dealers for financing.97
(2) The Dealer
"Almost half of the dealers reported that it had become more
92. Id. at 640.
93. Id. Repurchase agreements provide much the same insulation for fi-
nancers to consumer defenses as did the holder in due course doc-
trine. However, if the dealer is either absent or insolvent so that
he cannot honor the repurchase agreement, the consumer can still
present his defenses against the financer. For this reason, even with
repurchase agreements, financers are unlikely to purchase a dealer's
paper, unless the dealer is in a relatively stable financial condition.
94. One method is the reserve account. When the financer purchases the
note from the financer, typically he does not pay the dealer the full
face amount of the note. Rather, the financer retains a small per-
centage of the total-from 1 to 2% %-in an account under the dealer's
name. The financer could increase the cost of credit by increasing
the reserve account percentage. However, the study found that
reserve account requirements generally have not increased since the
Act went into effect. Note 88 supra, at 641.
95. Id. at 642.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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difficult to obtain financing since the Act."98  Several dealers
found it impossible to secure financing and were either severely
damaged in their business or were forced out of business alto-
gether.99 These results were explained by the changes in the
screening procedures required by financers. 100
Dealers reacted to the difficulty of obtaining financing in one
of three ways. A very few dealers ceased door-to-door operations
and worked instead from a permanent location.101 Some dealers
chose to finance consumer sales themselves. 0 2 The most common
reaction to the new situation was to decrease the percentage of
credit sales. 0 3  This might be brought about by encouraging con-
sumers to seek direct loans from financers; in some cases the dealer
might even attempt to establish relations with a financer to whom
he could refer his customers for direct loans. 04
Despite the difficulty that dealers had in obtaining financing
and their decision to reduce credit transactions, most dealers re-
ported an increase in sales volume since the Act. 0 5 This result,
the study indicated, might be explained by the fact that dealers
were avoiding the financer screening procedures by requiring cash
sales; some dealers were working harder to find cash buyers and
many had shifted their sales to higher income consumers who could
more easily purchase for cash and whose credit rating would en-
able them to obtain direct loans. 00
(3) The Consumer
The study attempted to measure the impact of the Act in terms
of its effectiveness in protection and advancement of consumer in-
terests.
Of course, the major direct benefit to consumers was the avail-
98. Id. at 643.
99. Id. at 644.
100. Many of the problems that dealers encountered were related to their
inability to comply with the substantive requirements of the financ-
er's new screening procedures, e.g., certain capital requirements, ac-
cepting repurchase agreements and taking smaller "incentive pay-
ments" or losing them altogether. Also there was an added burden
of increased paperwork imposed by the new screening techniques.
101. Id. at 644. The Connecticut Act applied only to home solicitation
sales. Therefore, if the dealer were to work from a permanent loca-
tion, he could finance with negotiable notes.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 645.
105. Id. at 645-46.
106. Id.
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ability of defenses in a suit brought by the financer.'0O
One of the principle arguments of those in favor of preserving
consumer defenses is that financers will be encouraged to more
carefully screen dealers and thereby rid the market of fraudulent
and insolvent dealers. Although the study did indicate that
screening procedures of financers had intensified, it also indicated
that the new procedures were not entirely successful in putting
fraudulent dealers out of business.'08 To the extent that the
screening techniques were concerned with the quality of the deal-
er's work, the consumers' interests in receiving a better product
were furthered. However, many other considerations influence a
financer's decision whether to do business with a dealer. It was
thought that the repurchase agreement, in many cases, allowed
the financer to be unconcerned with the quality of the dealers
work.109 This agreement affords the financer much the same pro-
tection as did the holder in due course status. It was not always
the fraudulent dealer who was eliminated by the requirement of
a repurchase agreement. The financers often refused to take the
notes of small legitimate dealers with few fixed assets and a weak
credit position; the repurchase agreement was worthless to the fi-
nancer if, as a practical matter, it could not be enforced against
the dealer.110
Second, in addition to the quality of the dealers work product,
the size of his business and the amount of business he did with
the financer were important factors in the decision whether to fi-
nance a dealer."' Financers were reportedly reluctant to cut the
volume dealer off; he brought in a substantial credit business and,
equally important, he may have meant business to the financer
in other respects, e.g., mortgages, savings and checking accounts." 2
These factors again may have the effect of damaging the small
legitimate dealer.
Because of the methods utilized by the financer to spread the
risk, particularly repurchase agreements and the discontinued use
of incentive payments, credit was more costly to dealers."13 Deal-
ers, in turn, passed this increased cost to the consumer.1 4 Because
107. Id. at 650-51.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 652-53.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 639.
112. Id.
113. See notes 98-106 and accompanying text supra.
114. Note 88 supra, at 653.
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of this increased cost of installment credit, the study reported a
general switch to direct loans.115
The Yale study is the only major empirical test of the theories
that have been advanced to justify legislation preserving consumer
defenses. There definitely was a difference in Connecticut in the
home solicitation sales industry before and after the Act. The
study reported "widespread difficulty in marketing consumer
paper" and a general tendency of dealers to reduce their credit
sales and to concentrate on cash-paying customers.
Many people who theorize that preservation of consumer de-
fenses will cause financers to more carefully screen the dealers
with whom they do business are correct, but the effect appears
to be more subtle than some have explained it. The crucial ques-
tion is, given more thorough screening, on what basis do financers
decide whether to finance a dealer. To the extent that it is quality
of work, the fraudulent or fly-by-night operator may be forced
out of the market. To the extent that it is volume of business,
many large, fraudulent dealers, or if not fraudulent, dealers who
sell substandard products or perform shoddy services, may still
be able to obtain financing. Many small legitimate dealers may
be severely damaged.
As was predicted, financers have utilized their powers to shift
the increased risk of being subject to consumer defenses back to
the dealer. The dealer, of course, has passed his increased cost
to the consumer. The increased cost, however, is spread through-
out the consumer credit industry, and it is justified if the "prod-
uct," i.e., consumer credit, is worth more to the consumer. The
product is better in that the individual consumer may not be forced
to absorb his entire loss resulting from dealer misconduct himself;
if the errant dealer is absent or insolvent, the consumer's defenses
are good against the financer.
The study suggested that elimination of negotiability may have
prompted a general shift away from the three-party installment
sales transaction. This traditional method of financing consumer
purchases was replaced either by direct loan financing or by a
reduction in credit sales. Many dealers placed a greater emphasis
than before on seeking cash customers. There is some fear that
the trend toward direct loans and cash sales may make consumer
credit worthless to low-income consumers. It is highly unlikely
that the low income will be among the cash-paying consumers.
Furthermore, while many low income consumers were able to ob-
115. Id. at 654-55.
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tain indirect-loan financing, it is probable that some of these same
consumers cannot obtain direct financing, or, at least, can do so
only at high interest rates.116
IV. CONCLUSION
There are two broad choices open to the Legislature as it de-
bates the preservation of consumer defenses issue. It can jump
on the bandwagon and join the growing number of states that
have eliminated negotiability in some or all consumer transactions.
In the alternative, it might hold off on legislation until it can
gather empirical data, in an attempt to determine the extent to
which, if any, consumer defenses should be preserved.117 The
choice is not a clear one. Obviously, many states have taken leg-
islative action without benefit of empirical study. Data would not
be easy to gather nor to analyze. Very little statistical informa-
tion exists now, and its validity is subject to some question. The
Yale project was concerned with a very limited segment of the
consumer credit industry-home solicitation sales of home im-
provements. The financers involved were predominantly commer-
cial banks as opposed to independent financing agencies. 118 An-
other caveat is that information was obtained primarily from fi-
nancers and dealers; that these parties may have had an interest
in the conclusion of the study should be considered in measuring
its reliability.119
116. Id.
117. L.B. 327, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1974), as introduced, would have pro-
vided for a consumer protection agency under the Attorney General
L.B. 327 § 8, would have provided that the director of such an agency,
'may conduct research, hold public hearings, make inquiries and pub-
lish studies relating to consumer sales acts or practices." Amend-
ments to the bill deleted these provisions, see note 14 supra.
118. Note 88 supra, at 625 n.34. "Banks handle most of the home improve-
ment financing in Connecticut."
119. In Shuchman, Empirical Studies in Commercial Law, 23 J. LEG. EDuc.
181 (1971), the author questions the methodology of the Yale project.
His first criticism was that the students depended on the subjects
of their study-financers and dealers-to do the research. Most ques-
tionnaires simply were sent through the mail and there were few
follow-up interviews. The author further pointed out:
Moreover, the Yale students needed and received help from
the co-counsel for the Connecticut Bankers Association (said
to be its chief lobbyist) and from the chairman of the Con-
necticut Home Improvement Association. The Yale students
conceded that their respondents were probably different than
the general population of those groups. The reader appreci-
ates their candor. But, then, having advised their readers
of probable bias in advice and of lack of representatives in
the completed questionnaires they proceed as if the mere
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On the other hand, whether or not the specific conclusions of
the Yale study are accepted as being accurate, the study did indi-
cate the kind of subtle effects that this legislation may have, per-
haps more subtle than some theories advanced to support the leg-
islation have suggested. One has only to look at the variety of
legislative approaches to this problem to know that there is no
consensus among the states concerning the extent to which, if any,
negotiability in consumer transactions should be prohibited. A
partial explanation for the variety in legislative response is that
in the absence of adequate empirical data, legislatures have been
unable to clearly identify the problem.
There are two basic questions that need empirical study. First,
what is the need for legislation? This question is directed at iden-
tifying those segments of the consumer credit industry where there
is a need to preserve consumer defenses. A study may be able
to isolate those consumer transactions where abuse does occur and
where the consumer is really at a disadvantage by not being able
to assert his defenses against the financers. Such an inquiry may
reveal that the need exists in all retail installment credit sales;
on the other hand, the information may identify a specific segment
of the industry, such as motor vehicle sales, home-solicitation
transactions or the consumer service industry. The second ques-
tion is directed at ascertaining the impact on the consumer credit
industry of preserving defenses; it is perhaps the more difficult
question. One relevant concern might be the impact on the cost
of credit. In addition, the Yale study raised some questions about
potential adverse effects on small legitimate dealers and low-in-
come consumers. Whether a state decides to protect consumers
at the possible expense of forcing some small dealers out of busi-
ness is a question of public policy for the legislature. Similarly,
the extent to which legislation might adversely affect the low-in-
come consumer's participation in consumer credit transactions is
a policy question. It is sugested that a legislature cannot fairly
deal with these policy questions without some statistical basis for
even knowing that they exist.
To a certain extent the inquiries as to need and impact may
overlap. For instance, if negotiability were eliminated in all retail
installment sales, an impact of this legislation may very well be
a shift to direct loan financing. The determination of this impact
warning was enough. Perhaps, they should have stopped
there rather than going on to ask the wolves how they tend




might then indicate a need for preserving defenses in the direct
loan transaction. Consequently, a legislative study should con-
sider as an integrated problem the three-party installment credit
sale, the direct loan and the lender credit card transaction.
For some, the proposition that negotiability should be elimi-
nated in all consumer credit transactions s a foregone con-
clusion.120 This article suggests that there are still some legislative
choices to be made, and that those choices can best be made if
based on results of the proposed empirical studies.
120. CLARK & FONSECA, supra note 1, § 12 at 14 (Supp. 1973), notes that
the "holder in due course doctrine appears to be dead." This is not
an entirely accurate statement. In the absence of a statute, most
courts continue to observe the doctrine, and even under many statutes
negotiability has not been completely eliminated.
